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ABSTRACT
The hinge moments for the A7A/B unit horizontal tail (UHT)
were computed for a range of airspeeds and altitudes representative
of the Southeast Asia combat environment. Electrical power avail-
able from the aircraft generator and the emergency power package
was determined. The horsepower required to overcome the maximum
hinge moment of the UHT was calculated and compared with power
available from the aircraft generator and the emergency power pack-
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Southeast Asia conflict over 1000 fixed-wing aircraft have
been lost to hostile ground fire. Some aircraft sustained catastrophic
damage and would have been unflyable regardless of the type of flight
control system installed. However, a sizeable number of aircraft
were lost due to relatively minor damage to the hydraulic flight
control system. A general exception to this was the McDonnell-
Douglas A-4, in various models, which on occasion sustained fifteen
square foot holes, or larger, completely through the wing with im-
mediate massive hydraulic failure. Even with the severe degradation
of flying qualities, the aircraft and pilot were often recovered aboard
ship because of a manual backup flight control system. Even if
landing was not possible the pilot was usually able to make it to a
"safe" ejection area.
With the present heavy, long fuselage, large control surface
aircraft, it is not possible for a pilot to control the aircraft at high
maneuvering speeds without a power boost of some sort. Aircraft
in this category generally employ single-path mechanical linkages
to dual hydraulically powered actuators. There are areas in the
fuselage and at the actuators themselves where the two hydraulic
systems must come into close proximity. At these vulnerable places
a single, small-arms round has caused dual hydraulic failure, loss
of control, and subsequent loss of life or capture of the crew by




II. A7A/B HYDRAULIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
In the A7A/B aircraft, irreversible control servomechanisms
power the control surfaces and are in turn controlled by the pilot
through mechanical linkages. The lateral-directional control system
consists of outer wing section ailerons, center wing section spoiler-
slot-deflectors, and a conventional rudder. The two horizontal
stabilizers, one on each side of the tail fuselage, are collectively
known as the Unit Horizontal Tail (UHT) and provide coordinated
pitch control. The lateral and longitudinal systems respond to auto-
pilot inputs, and the rudder is stabilized. Series trim is introduced
into the rudder and aileron signal linkages and parallel trim inputs
are introduced into the UHT linkage. Mechanical springs, bobweights,
and viscous dampers provide artificial feel and control-stick center-
ing forces.
Hydraulic power is supplied by two independent power control
systems designated PCI and PC2. The PCl and PC2 systems have
separate hydraulic lines, reservoirs, and engine driven pumps.
Under normal operating conditions both systems supply pressure
to tandem actuators in the flight control system. If either PC system
fails the other should supply adequate power for flight. If both PC
systems fail and the emergency power package (EPP) fails to restore
PCl pressure, the UHT will move trailing edge down to a zero tail
angle of attack giving an aircraft nose down pitch. Airframe Change
Number 50 inserts check valves at the inlet ports of the UHT actua-
tors to delay this UHT movement. In addition, Airframe Change

Number 15 moves the hydraulic lines in the aft section of the aircraft
further apart and protects the UHT actuators with armor plate.
Fluid flows from the PCI and PC2 hydraulic pumps through the
system pressure lines into the actuating cylinders, and from the
cylinder return ports into the system return lines. Hydraulic com-
ponents are protected from overpressure by a pressure relief valve.
Fluid returns to the PCI and PC2 reservoir and hydraulic pumps
separately.
The PCI system has a surge damper /accumulator to absorb
pressure surges in the lines and to maintain pressure in the return
line when main system pres sure drops below 1800 psi. This ac-
cumulator is precharged to 1500 psi with nitrogen by the accumulator
precharge system and is charged with hydraulic fluid by means of
the system pressure line.
If system pressure drops below 1800 psi a pressure sensitive
check valve between the surge damper /accumulator and the system
pressure line closes to maintain the accumulator pressure. This in
turn pressurizes the fluid reservoir to provide inlet pressure for
the hydraulic pump in the emergency power package. If the PCl
system fails due to a line leak, the EPP cannot supply pressure to
the flight controls because the EPP uses the PCl system hydraulic
lines.
The PC2 system powers the nose gear steering, wheel brakes,
landing gear, arresting gear, leading and trailing edge flaps, wing-
fold, and catapult launch bar. In addition, this system powers the
other half of the flight control tandem actuators.

The utilities circuit is separated from the flight controls by an
isolation valve manually controlled by the flap handle. When this
valve is closed a leak in the utilities will not cause a loss of pressure
in the power control system. A return line check valve prevents
fluid back flow into the utility circuits and possible loss of PC2 supply
4
system fluid even with the isolation valve closed.

III. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
The description of the present A7A/B hydraulic system indicates
that its redundancies are adequate for peace-time operation. How-
ever, experiences with the F-105, F4-B and RA5C aircraft have
shown redundancies such as these to be inadequate for combat
operations.
The NATOPS Flight Manual for the A7A/B aircraft states:
"Complete loss of power control system hydraulic pressure may
result in an uncontrollable nose down pitch and high negative
-g
forces. If loss of both power control systems is evident and the
EPP will not restore PCl pressure, abandon the aircraft prior to
complete loss of pressure and resulting negative-g pitch-down.
Consider placing the left hand on alternate ejection handle if de-
laying ejection to the last minute. Following uncontrollable pitch,
g forces may exceed pilot capability to successfully eject. Airframe
Change No. 50 installs check valves at the UHT actuators to reduce
the violence of the pitchover. This provides the pilot a more
favorable g environment for ejection and gives him more time to
4
eject.
The first problem was to determine the most probable envelope
within which the backup flight control system must operate. Initial
assumptions were that upon sustaining battle damage consisting of
partial or full hydraulic failure, the pilot will jettison all stores
and armaments to initiate a return to a safe area. The aircraft
then has a clean configuration of about 23, 000 pounds gross weight
of which approximately 5000 pounds is fuel.
10

The usual range of combat altitudes is from 3000 feet to 15, 000
feet above mean sea level. During anti-aircraft missile evasion,
sea level altitudes are occasionally encountered. It is at these
altitudes that the aircraft has a high probability of damage from
anti-aircraft gun fire. The altitude envelope was chosen to be sea
level to 15, 000 feet. The airspeed envelope is from 200 knots to
450 knots or Mach . 3 to Mach . 7. Two hundred knots could be
experienced at the apogee of a poorly executed pop-up bombing
maneuver and 450 knots is a likely bomb release airspeed. A cruise
in airspeed would be within this airspeed bracket.
With the flight envelope defined, it was then necessary to deter-
mine the hinge moment for the UHT at representative points in the
flight envelope. The hinge moment (HM) was calculated using the
following equations:
(1) HM - CH q ST cT







(3) S™ cT = 134. 5 feet per panel, a constant which
includes the tail efficiency factor.
(4) Tail angle of attack ( Ct ) = Q -€ + i , where
1 x Uo t
i is the tail incidence angle.
Figures (1), (2) and (3) were combined to give Figure (4),
Downwash ( € ) as a Function of Mach Number (M) and Fuselage
Angle of Attack ( 0t ). Figure (4) made it possible to determine
downwash as a function of fuselage angle of attack and Mach Number.
Values for the fuselage angle of attack and tail incidence angle
were taken from Reference 6, pages A-4 and A- 5. These values
11

were plotted versus Mach Number to give Figures (5) and (6) for sea
level and 15, 000 feet altitude respectively. C„ taken from
5
U
Figure (7) was already a function of altitude and Mach Number.
Using Figures (4), (5), (6) and (7) all variables were specified
as functions of altitude and Mach Number. A negative tail angle
of attack gives a negative tail lift producing a positive aircraft
pitching moment and tail hinge moment.
A solution for the tail hinge-moment problem consisted of first
using equation (4) to find the tail angle of attack. Fuselage angle
of attack and the tail incidence angle were extracted from Figures
(5) or (6) depending on altitude. Downwash was determined using
Figure (4) with Mach Number and fuselage angle of attack specifying
the variable. Figure (7) was used to find Ctj as a function of
hi.
it
altitude and Mach Number.
With all variables defined as a function of a given altitude and
Mach Number, equation (1) was solved. Results of these calculations
are in Appendix A in tabular form. Note that the tail hinge moment
equation was solved for Mach Numbers from 0. 3 to 0. 8 and for two
altitudes, sea level and 15, 000 feet.
The tail angle of attack is negative for all cases and with a
complete hydraulic failure the UHT would assume a zero angle of
attack giving zero tail lift and a consequent nose down pitching
moment to the aircraft. The hinge moment is a maximum at sea
level, therefore sea level figures were used to determine power
requirements for the UHT. Mach 0. 7 was selected as the upper
limit for the speed envelope prior to finding that the hinge moment
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DOWNWASH AS A FUNCTION OF MACH NUMBER
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From Appendix A it can be seen that the tail hinge moment
increases with airspeed and decreases with altitude. The maximum
tail hinge moment of interest was calculated to be 1900 foot-pounds
and occurred at sea level at Mach 0. 7. This hinge moment would
have to be overcome or neutralized by the backup flight control
system if the system is to fulfill the flight envelope requirements.
20

IV. ELECTRICAL SOLUTION TO DESIGN PROBLEM
Originally it was hoped that by simply rearranging some aircraft
components and adding a little additional electrical wiring a useable
backup control system could be developed at very little cost with
practically no addition to the weight of the aircraft. Further invest-
igation revealed that the trim motors envisioned as being capable of
moving control surfaces were inadequate for this purpose as they
were designed as simple servo motors used for positioning hydraulic
actuators. These trim motors did not have enough power to directly
7
position a control surface.
Additional solutions to the problem were considered such as an
2
asymmetric thrust reverser, or a third hydraulic system as used
in the A7E. The first system was rejected because it necessitated
total redesign of the engine and airframe. This would be costly and
would mean a large increase in weight. The third hydraulic system
concept was investigated thoroughly but only as a last resort because
of the added weight. In addition it was desired to make the backup
flight control system completely independent of hydraulics. Since
a manual backup system was out of the question for the UHT, an
electrical system seemed to be the answer.
The aircraft generator has a 25KVA power generating capacity
and the emergency power package (EPP) is capable of producing
2. 5 KVA. The aircraft generator and EPP produce 33. 5 horsepower
and 3. 35 horsepower respectively. To calculate the horsepower
rating of the required electrical motor to drive the UHT, a control
21

surface rate of movement of 5 degrees per second was considered to
be adequate but this figure was doubled to provide a conservative
solution until such time as the system could be tested on an analog
8,9
computer.
Using maximum values of the hinge moment and a 10 degree per
second control surface rate of travel it was determined that a 0. 603
horsepower electric motor would adequately handle the hinge moment.
Therefore even with a relatively low-efficiency electric motor there
is sufficient power available from the EPP to power the proposed
UHT drive.
Figure (8) shows the proposed backup flight control system.
The control stick in the A7 could be used to control the movement of
the UHT as in normal flight. It is suggested that the control stick
10
be set up as a rigid, force controller with strain gage sensors
For backup operations control power would be supplied to the UHT
electric motor at a rate proportional to the force sensed by the
control stick sensors. A modification would be required to the
automatic flight control system so that with a loss of hydraulic
pressure the longitudinal automatic flight control system actuators
would lock in a neutral position giving a longitudinally rigid stick.
Power to the system would be supplied by either the aircraft
generator or the EPP. In addition it should be noted that a minimum
of three different electric control cables lead to the electric motor.
These cables would be routed to the electric motor over widely

































V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For simplicity all calculations were made assuming that the
UHT acts as one unit. Actually both halves of the UHT move inde-
pendently but synchronously. Therefore two motors of half the
calculated horsepower are required for each half of the UHT. The
two motors must be synchronized but this presents no problem.
Because of the restrictors present in the UHT actuators, the electric
motors would not have to assume the UHT load from the normal
hydraulic system instantaneously.
t
It would appear that this longitudinal backup system would permit
the aircraft to land even with a hydraulic failure. Lateral-directional
controls should also be considered and with the reserve electrical
power remaining even from the EPP it is feasible to operate either
the ailerons or rudder electrically. The ideal solution would be to
operate the rudder manually by cables using a hydraulic disconnect
system similar to that in the A-4 aircraft. This would permit the
pilot to work only against aerodynamic loads, not the hydraulic
linkage and actuators as well.
The rigid stick control was selected because this means of
control seems to permit better tracking or more precise control
of the aircraft without interference from the normal control system
components. In addition this method should enable the pilot to put
in smoother inputs to the UHT motors, and permit a rapid shift




It would be useful to set up the equations of motion for the A 7
aircraft on an analog computer and try several tracking problems
with the backup flight control system. An optimum figure for the
rate of UHT movement could be derived as well as the behavior of
this system in turbulence. Electrical control of ailerons or manual
control of the rudder could be simulated and the ability of the pilot
to land using the backup system could be determined.
It appears that an electrical or an electrical/manual backup
flight control system for the A7A/B aircraft is not only desirable





















































UJ^ cc N in <*• fO







k. N CD CO o if) CM
i'l ro ro «t <fr to
O O O c O O
X - * • - •
o i i i 1 i i
e> I





8 i 1 i i i 1
^_^







o o CD o o
N CD CO cv ro CO



















U. CD CO CO C\J
^*
to •
CO o CD <fr
.a K-K d ^ CO CD
-J roi^j N ;.'. CM T
cr ro LO r^ CD



























ui*^r CM r> <t CO IO 005= co
CD ^r CD qcn o
O-J N o O o to o
CD to N o CM COO CD —
>
o O CM








9 C O — ml ro U)
0)
















3 i 1 i 1 i I
O oo do 2 o
Ul injiq
ro»cM
<*] N sr CMQ iMM
U»
^_^
CD No On O O
UJ N CM lO ro CD
u. d 00 lO •-,'• ro CM
£J
CD si- to lO c: to o













Lu <# U0 CD ro <fr CM
CDo <tf CD to cv|












1. Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory Technical Report
AFFDL-TR-70-48, Requirements for Minimum Backup
Flight Control Systems, by Eugene E. Yore, p. 1-6, 18, 21,
36, October, 1970.
2. Longstaff, T. W. , A Manual Stand-by Control System for
Tactical Fighter Aircraft Through the Use of an Asymmetric
Thrust Reverser , Masters Thesis, Air Force Institute of
Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1969.
3. Vought Aeronautics Division, LTV Aerospace Corporation,
Report No. 2 -51 724/5R-5131 , A-7 Flight Control Systems
Design Report, by M. R. Skinner and C. Welgehausen,
p. 78-100, September, 1965.
4. Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, NAVAIR 01-45AAA-1,
NATOPS Flight Manual A-7A, A-7B Aircraft
, p. 1-40 to
1-52 to 1-82, 5-31, 15 August 1969.
5. Figures received with letter of 13 April 1971 from Mr. W. C.
Heald, Unit 2-53362, Vought Ae ronautics Co., LTV Aero-
space Corporation.
6. Vought Aeronautics Division, LTV Aerospace Corporation,
Report No. 2- 53320/7R-5326, A-7B Estimated Flying
Qualities (U)
,
by J. D. Etheridge, p. A-4, A-5, 14 December
T96T:
7. Brite, R.J. and Fioranelli, C. H. , Synchros and Servos , Howard
W. Sams & Co., Inc., 1967.
8. Vought Aeronautics Division, LTV Aerospace Corporation,
Report No. 2 - 53560/9R-5448, Final Engineering Report
Automatic Flight Control System for A-7D/E Aircraft (U ),
by R. A. Jeske and R. P. Anderson, p. 9, 28-33, 50, undated.
9. Friedman, M. H. and Rosenblatt, J. , Direct and Alternating
Current Machinery
,
McGraw-Kfi.ll Book Company, Inc.
,
p. 84-85, 1963.
10. Caswell, D. W.
,
Development of a Simulator for the Evaluation
of Rigid and Moveable Aircraft Controls
,
Masters Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June, 1969-
11. Blakelock, J. H. , Automatic Control of Aircraft and Missiles ,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.





1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Professor Donald Layton, Code 57Ln 1
Department of Aeronautical Engineering
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. LCDR Charles C. Cromer 1
Naval Air Systems Command
Naval Plant Representative Office
LTV Aerospace Corporation
P. O. Box 5907
Dallas, Texas 75222











DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA -R&D
[Security c las si fie at ion of title, body of abstrac t and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report / s classified)
1 o^'GinatinG ACTIVITY (Corporate author)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
2a. REPORT SECURITY C L A SSI F I C A T I Or
Unclas sified
2b. CROUP
3 REPOR T TITLE
A Feasibility Study for a Backup Flight Control System for the A7A/B Aircraft
4 DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type ol report and. inclusive dates)
Master's Thesis; September 1971
5 AUTHORiSI (firs/ n»m«, middle initial, last name)
Richard Jeffrey Miles
6 REPOR T O A TE 7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES
September 1971 30
7b. NO OF REFS
11
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO
b. PROJEC T NO.
9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
9b. OTHER REPORT NOISI (Any other numbers that may be assigned
this report)
10 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.




The hinge moments for the A7A/B unit horizontal tail (UHT) were computed
for a range of airspeeds and altitudes representative of the Southeast Asia
combat environment. Electrical power available from the aircraft generator
and the emergency power package was determined. The horsepower required
to overcome the maximum hinge moment of the UHT was calculated and com-
pared with power available from the aircraft generator and the emergency
power package in order to ascertain whether an electrical motor could control
UHT movement.
DD , Fr.,1473























c.l A feasibi 1 i ty study
for a beickup f 1 i ght
control system for the





1 A feasibility study
for a backup f l i ght
control system for the
A7A/B ai rcraft.
IhesM58518
A feasibility study for a backup flight
3 2768 001 88347 3
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
